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Guest Commentary January 28, 2002
Federalizing Security at Nuclear Power Plants
The Honorable William Delahunt
As Congress examines ways to protect critical infrastructure in the wake of September 11, the vulnerability of commercial nuclear reactors has become increasingly evident. Even before then, the potential hazards associated with nuclear power have long required special vigilance; and the terrorist attack obviously elevates the gravity and urgency of security concerns. All of us who represent areas with commercial nuclear facilities share an urgent concern for safeguarding residents who live in close proximity to the 103 facilities across the country.
Most Americans understand that we can't completely insulate the nation -- and every person and property in it -- from attack by suicidal terrorists. Nearly everyone appreciates the complexities and expense involved, and grasps the need to balance security precautions with civil liberties and economic impact. But the fact remains that there is no more fundamental responsibility of government than homeland defense, and that addressing vulnerabilities -- including those associated with nuclear plants -- are essential.
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The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has acknowledged that the nation's commercial reactors were not designed to withstand the type of attack carried out against the World Trade Towers. In light of this new potential threat and in the context of analogous legislation relating to airport safeguards, it seems to me self-evident that we explore the prospect of a federal security force charged with protecting nuclear plants.
Within hours of the September attacks, security at nuclear plants went on high alert. In my own congressional district, the Pilgrim facility took significant new precautions against potential threats to perimeter security from both the ground and the water. Although the immediate response was sound, I remain concerned about long-term protection of the plant. The NRC is presumably consulting with the new office of Homeland Security and various other federal agencies on coordinated efforts to buttress nuclear safeguards; however, its approach seems focused on existing protocols rather than new methods. Even as legislation to federalize airport screening regimes was signed into law, however, the equivalent discussion of a federal nuclear plant security force has received only scant attention.
Historically, it appears the NRC has not moved aggressively to explore the potential authority for federalization under existing statute, much less for administrative or legislative initiatives to create a federal presence. Correspondence with my office over the last four months suggests the NRC is not inclined to examine section 102 of the Atomic Energy Act, which could offer relevant authority. The agency rationale is that "the Commission is confident that substantial protection is being provided to plants."
Perhaps that reluctance derives from a substantive disagreement about the need even to review a federal approach. In written remarks to a Senate colleague, the NRC Chairman stated last month that "there have been no failures in nuclear plant security of the type that would warrant the creation of a new federal security force" and warned that, by federalizing security, the government would incur an exorbitant cost "all to address a non-existent problem".
I seek neither to raise undue alarm nor to condemn the current security protocol. However, in a series of meetings since September 11 with local, state and federal officials about public health and safety in the dozens of communities near the Pilgrim plant, one of the most recurring and compelling themes has been the need for serious and thorough consideration of a federal force.
The consequences of getting this wrong are unthinkable. It seems to me that an independent examination of a number of technical and financial issues by the GAO would be invaluable. Accordingly, I wrote today to the Comptroller General to ask the GAO to:
1. Review current federal guidelines and protocols for safeguarding nuclear plants from the air (including through the use of no-fly zones); through perimeter ground security measures; and through coastal security measures;
2. Examine the jurisdictional issues and administrative obstacles to transferring responsibility for security from plant owners to the federal government; and
3. Analyze the cost of federalizing security--including initial training, upkeep, and long-term protection.
I have no presuppositions about the outcome of such a study, or about the policy debate it could help inform. However, I remain deeply concerned about the consequences of failing to explore these issues on an expedited basis.
William Delahunt is a Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts). The above column has been adapted from his extension of floor remarks as printed in the Congressional Record, January 25, 2002. To contact him, Click Here.
The above column has been distributed by PoliticsOL.com.
