[an error occurred while processing this directive]
[an error occurred while processing this directive]
[an error occurred while processing this directive]
[an error occurred while processing this directive]
[an error occurred while processing this directive]
[an error occurred while processing this directive]
PoliticsOL.com Editorial - Week of April 22, 2001
U.S. Needs to Be Crystal Clear Re: Taiwan
Wars often start due to an aggressor's miscalculation of how its adversary will react to its actions. Often, this is because the adversary has been vague, inconsistent or has based its defense strategy on its own reading of an opponent's intentions rather than its capabilities.
Adolf Hitler believed Great Britain and France wouldn't go to war to defend Poland in 1939. After all, the British and French lacked any means of actually defending the Poles and had taken no military action against Germany when Hitler first threatened to take the Sudetenland in September 1938 or after Germany seized the rest of Czechoslovakia six months later.
Joseph Stalin believed Hitler would honor the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939. As a result, the U.S.S.R. did virtually nothing substantial to strengthen its defenses along its borders with Germany and other Axis states in the nearly two years proceeding Germany's Operation Barbarossa. Even after German panzer units had driven deep into Russian territory in June 1941, Stalin was still in denial, locking himself into seclusion for days while the Soviet Union desperately needed his leadership.
In 1950, Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed President Harry Truman that, based on U.S. intelligence, there was no reason to believe that Communist China would intervene in the Korea War. But, the Chinese had secretly amassed several hundred thousand troops north of the Yalu River for just that eventuality. It was most likely the U.S. miscalculation as to Soviet intentions that dissuaded the U.S. from risking all-out war with China. As a result of its intervention in the war, China nearly faced nuclear retaliation because its leaders calculated that the U.S. would quickly pull out of the peninsula or be defeated.
In late July 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker issued a cable that said, in part, "we take no position on the border delineation issue raised by Iraq with respect to Kuwait." Reading this as a green light, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein followed through on his threats to take Kuwait by force one week later. The result was a massive buildup of coalition forces and eventual military action to kick the Iraqis out of Kuwait. The United States and its allies spent over $61 billion in the war effort, over 100,000 lives were lost on both sides combined, and the U.S. continues to maintain a strong military presence in the region just to keep the status quo as existed before the initial Iraqi aggression.
For the past twenty-two years the United States has deliberately been vague when concerning how it would react to a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan. Advocates of such a policy point to the fact that because the Communist flag still does not fly over Taipei that such a policy continues to be a sound one. In reality, the primary reason why the Chinese haven't attempted an invasion across the strait is because, up until now, such an exercise would fail dismally.
However, in ten years time, perhaps sooner, such a failure would no longer be a given. The continued, steady buildup of the Chinese military will eventually tip the scales of balance into the Communists' favor.
When the probability of success becomes high enough, the only remaining obstacle to an invasion will be how the Chinese predict U.S. reaction. In a decade or two, a future American president might have decades of U.S. vagueness on the issue challenged. A bluff is never a credible defensive policy once called. Instead, it is a recipe for disaster.
In 1996, Chinese Lt. General Xiong Guangkai publicly stated that he doubted the U.S. would be willing to "trade Los Angeles for Taipei." Clearly, comments such as these indicate that at least some Chinese leaders serious question whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan with American blood.
If the United States doesn't make it crystal clear that it will fight to defend Taiwan and help the island turn back a Chinese invasion, then the only remaining credible alternative is to arm Taiwan to the teeth with the means to defend itself. Anything else would be kowtowing to the Communists. Such a result would also send the signal to Taiwan that they'll be on their own in the near future. This would substantially raise the stakes, as Taiwanese leaders might resort to developing a nuclear deterrent as their last means of defense, asking the Communist Chinese if they'd be willing to 'trade Beijing for Taipei.'
It is in the best interest of the whole world that such a turn of events not happen. But, continued U.S. vagueness on the issue of defending Taiwan will only make it more likely.
PoliticsOL.com reserves the right to shorten or to edit letters for clarity. Only signed letters will be considered for publication. (i.e., include name, city & state of residence)
[an error occurred while processing this directive]
[an error occurred while processing this directive]
For the past twenty-two years the United States has deliberately been vague when concerning how it would react to a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan. Advocates of such a policy point to the fact that because the Communist flag still does not fly over Taipei that such a policy continues to be a sound one. In reality, the primary reason why the Chinese haven't attempted an invasion across the strait is because, up until now, such an exercise would fail dismally.
